信息的避免

Information Avoidance

《Journal of Economic Literature 》2017              作者: Russell Golman, David Hagmann, and George Loewenstein

内容摘要We commonly think of information as a means to an end. However, a growing theoretical and experimental literature suggests that information may directly enter the agent’s utility function. This can create an incentive to avoid information, even when it is useful, free, and independent of strategic considerations. We review research documenting the occurrence of information avoidance, as well as theoretical and empirical research on reasons why people avoid information, drawing from economics, psychology, and other disciplines. The review concludes with a discussion of some of the diverse (and often costly) individual and societal consequences of information avoidance.


下载链接:《Information Avoidance

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