Should a monopolistic vendor adopt the selling model or the leasing model for information goods or services? We study this question in the context of consumer valu-ation depreciation. Using a two-period game-theoretic model, we consider two types of consumer valuation depreciation for information goods or services: vintage depreciation and individual depreciation. Vintage depreciation assumes that a good or service loses some of its appeal to consumers as it becomes dated, and this eﬀect persists independent of usage. Individual depreciation instead assumes that valuation depreciation happens only for consumers who have consumed or experienced the good or service. We identify condi-tions under which each pricing model is preferred. For vintage depreciation information goods, the leasing model dominates the selling model in vendor proﬁt. For individual depreciation information goods, the selling model dominates the leasing model as long as the magnitude of individual depreciation exceeds a certain threshold; otherwise, leasing dominates selling. We consider several model extensions such as when network eﬀects are present. Furthermore, we show a negative interaction eﬀect between vintage depreciation and network eﬀects in vendor proﬁt. By contrast, the interaction eﬀect between individ-ual depreciation and network eﬀects can be either negative or positive, depending on the magnitude of individual depreciation. Managerial implications are also discussed.