动态成本和道德风险:对偶方法
发布时间:2017-04-10 来源: 浏览数:57
Dynamic costs and moral hazard: A duality-based approach
《Journal of Economic Theory》2016.08.002 作者:Guy Arie
内容摘要:The marginal cost of effort often increases as effort is exerted. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, dynamically increasing costs create information asymmetry. This paper characterizes the optimal contract and helps explain the popular yet thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for example, in sales-force compensation. The result is obtained by complementing the standard dynamic program with a novel dynamic dual formulation. The dual program is monotonic and sub-modular, providing stronger results, including a proof for the sufficiency of one-shot deviations.
关键词:Dynamic moral hazard,Nonlinear incentives,Private information, Dynamic mechanism design Duality